We all remember with fondness Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister.
In the tradition of Sir Humphrey Appleby, here is the reason nothing gets done……quickly, it’s just carefully considered
Below is a fully‑formed Sir Humphrey Appleby–style briefing note, written exactly as he would present it to a Minister seeking reassurance (or obfuscation) about why UK infrastructure projects take so long. It is structured, bureaucratic, and exquisitely unhelpful — in the best possible way.
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BRIEFING NOTE
From: Sir Humphrey Appleby, KCB, MA (Oxon)
To: The Minister
Subject: Allegations of Civil Service “Inertia” in Infrastructure Delivery
Classification: For the Minister’s Eyes Only
---
1. Purpose of Note
To provide the Minister with a comprehensive explanation — or, where necessary, a comprehensively confusing explanation — of the factors contributing to the perceived elongation of major infrastructure timelines, and to equip the Minister with appropriate language to rebut claims of bureaucratic delay.
---
2. Summary
It would be wholly inaccurate, Minister, to attribute delays in infrastructure projects to “inertia” within the Civil Service. The apparent slowness is, in fact, the natural and unavoidable consequence of:
• Rigorous procedural safeguards
• Interdepartmental coordination requirements
• Statutory consultation obligations
• Judicial review contingencies
• Fiscal prudence protocols
• Environmental, ecological, archaeological, hydrological, and occasionally ornithological assessments
In short, Minister, the system is not slow — it is thorough.
---
3. Key Points for Ministerial Use
• “The Civil Service does not delay projects; it protects them.”
(A reassuring phrase that sounds decisive while committing you to nothing.)
• “Infrastructure timelines reflect the complexity of modern governance.”
(This implies that anyone who disagrees simply doesn’t understand modern governance.)
• “We must avoid the perils of precipitate action.”
(A classic defence: speed is dangerous, delay is responsible.)
• “The public would expect us to proceed only after full consultation.”
(The public rarely expects this, but it is helpful to say they do.)
---
4. Detailed Explanation (For Deployment When Cornered)
Minister, major infrastructure projects necessarily involve:
• Pre‑feasibility studies
• Feasibility studies
• Pre‑consultations
• Consultations
• Post‑consultations
• Impact assessments
• Re‑assessments of the impact assessments
• Cross‑departmental steering groups
• Steering groups to determine the remit of the steering groups
• Gateway reviews
• Pre‑gateway reviews
• Post‑gateway reflections
• Value‑for‑money analyses
• Re‑analyses of the value‑for‑money analyses
It is therefore mathematically impossible for such a process to be completed quickly without undermining the very safeguards designed to ensure that it is completed properly.
---
5. Recommended Ministerial Lines to Take
• “We are streamlining processes while maintaining essential safeguards.”
(This commits you to nothing but sounds modern.)
• “We are accelerating delivery where appropriate.”
(The word appropriate is doing all the work.)
• “We must balance speed with accountability.”
(No one can argue with accountability.)
• “The Civil Service is working tirelessly to ensure best value for the taxpayer.”
(Always popular.)
Each of these lines is designed to be deployed repeatedly, regardless of the question asked.
---
6. Risks and Mitigations
• Risk: Media claims of bureaucratic obstruction.
Mitigation: Emphasise “due diligence”, “public consultation”, and “value for money”.
• Risk: Opposition demands for faster delivery.
Mitigation: Suggest they are advocating “reckless haste”.
• Risk: Select Committee scrutiny.
Mitigation: Provide extensive documentation. The volume alone will exhaust them.
---
7. Conclusion
Minister, far from demonstrating inertia, the Civil Service’s approach to infrastructure delivery exemplifies the highest standards of administrative prudence. Any attempt to accelerate processes risks undermining the very foundations of responsible government.
As ever, I remain at your disposal should you require further clarification — or, indeed, further obfuscation.
Isn’t part of the reason for higher costs in the UK related to how risk is managed and priced into construction costs? The whole subcontractors and external agents vs in-house is downstream of decisions to minimise risk at the very significant outcome of higher costs. Another factor is quality which is being ratcheted upwards through increased demands for nicer things or more bureaucratic requirements. With the project management triangle if you want high quality and your timescales are rigid your costs are going rise to compensate.
How many people care if their Swindon to London journey is 50 instead of 60? Are they electing people to get it, shouting at their MP about faster trains? It means for the odd meeting with a client, you get 10 more minutes in bed.
Britain overwhelmingly has the valuable infrastructure that it needs. It would be nice to join Heathrow with the Great Western Main Line and I could get a train direct from Heathrow to Swindon in about an hour instead of 90 minutes by coach, but a few times a year, do I really care that much? Is it going to stop me seeing a company in Switzerland? Is it worth the near £1bn cost to do it?
So, much of our infrastructure development is political vanity. It doesn't get spent because of necessity but because there's money to burn and someone with an ego that wants to build monuments to their greatness like Millenium museums, bridges, HS2. The failures in this country are about boring things like not enough medical staff, police that don't deal with crime, railways that can't price correctly and the failure of government to get out of the way, put money back into people's pockets and let them do efficient things.
I haven't been responsible for a major government infrastructure project, but I have been involved in investment decisions in the private sector as a CFO - where some of the dynamics are likely the same.
On that basis I would add (1) that consistency of purpose is as important as consistency of funding. Often what derails a development programme or makes it more expensive is chopping and changing about what one is trying to achieve because there is not sufficient coherence at the level of the leadership team about what is wanted. Often it doesn't matter so much what you as decide as long as you decide something and stick to it. And that you decide this reasonably quickly. A hard decision doesn't need to be a slow decision.
And (2) as in one of the examples that Sam quotes, you quite often get a situation where the board does not like the cost of what is proposed but sees the the requirement for whatever is being costed. Which leads to a cycle of redoing the financial analysis to get to a lower (and undeliverable) cost, meaning (a) delay while this is done (b) an initial plan which is probably unrealistic (c) some sub-optimal decisions which later need to be reversed (d) lots of angst, further analysis (and probably delay) while the actual costs overshoot the new plan (e) a succession of new and ever increasing cost projections, which no-one believes (and which therefore damage the cost discipline in the project) and (f) an outcome which is at least expensive as the original proposal, but slower.
Capex cut in the early 1990s and not recommenced until the 2010s. Surely the railways weren't being fattened up for their mid-90s privatisation. Surely Railtrack and the first TOCs didn't cut capex to the bone? Surely not?
We all remember with fondness Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister.
In the tradition of Sir Humphrey Appleby, here is the reason nothing gets done……quickly, it’s just carefully considered
Below is a fully‑formed Sir Humphrey Appleby–style briefing note, written exactly as he would present it to a Minister seeking reassurance (or obfuscation) about why UK infrastructure projects take so long. It is structured, bureaucratic, and exquisitely unhelpful — in the best possible way.
---
BRIEFING NOTE
From: Sir Humphrey Appleby, KCB, MA (Oxon)
To: The Minister
Subject: Allegations of Civil Service “Inertia” in Infrastructure Delivery
Classification: For the Minister’s Eyes Only
---
1. Purpose of Note
To provide the Minister with a comprehensive explanation — or, where necessary, a comprehensively confusing explanation — of the factors contributing to the perceived elongation of major infrastructure timelines, and to equip the Minister with appropriate language to rebut claims of bureaucratic delay.
---
2. Summary
It would be wholly inaccurate, Minister, to attribute delays in infrastructure projects to “inertia” within the Civil Service. The apparent slowness is, in fact, the natural and unavoidable consequence of:
• Rigorous procedural safeguards
• Interdepartmental coordination requirements
• Statutory consultation obligations
• Judicial review contingencies
• Fiscal prudence protocols
• Environmental, ecological, archaeological, hydrological, and occasionally ornithological assessments
In short, Minister, the system is not slow — it is thorough.
---
3. Key Points for Ministerial Use
• “The Civil Service does not delay projects; it protects them.”
(A reassuring phrase that sounds decisive while committing you to nothing.)
• “Infrastructure timelines reflect the complexity of modern governance.”
(This implies that anyone who disagrees simply doesn’t understand modern governance.)
• “We must avoid the perils of precipitate action.”
(A classic defence: speed is dangerous, delay is responsible.)
• “The public would expect us to proceed only after full consultation.”
(The public rarely expects this, but it is helpful to say they do.)
---
4. Detailed Explanation (For Deployment When Cornered)
Minister, major infrastructure projects necessarily involve:
• Pre‑feasibility studies
• Feasibility studies
• Pre‑consultations
• Consultations
• Post‑consultations
• Impact assessments
• Re‑assessments of the impact assessments
• Cross‑departmental steering groups
• Steering groups to determine the remit of the steering groups
• Gateway reviews
• Pre‑gateway reviews
• Post‑gateway reflections
• Value‑for‑money analyses
• Re‑analyses of the value‑for‑money analyses
It is therefore mathematically impossible for such a process to be completed quickly without undermining the very safeguards designed to ensure that it is completed properly.
---
5. Recommended Ministerial Lines to Take
• “We are streamlining processes while maintaining essential safeguards.”
(This commits you to nothing but sounds modern.)
• “We are accelerating delivery where appropriate.”
(The word appropriate is doing all the work.)
• “We must balance speed with accountability.”
(No one can argue with accountability.)
• “The Civil Service is working tirelessly to ensure best value for the taxpayer.”
(Always popular.)
Each of these lines is designed to be deployed repeatedly, regardless of the question asked.
---
6. Risks and Mitigations
• Risk: Media claims of bureaucratic obstruction.
Mitigation: Emphasise “due diligence”, “public consultation”, and “value for money”.
• Risk: Opposition demands for faster delivery.
Mitigation: Suggest they are advocating “reckless haste”.
• Risk: Select Committee scrutiny.
Mitigation: Provide extensive documentation. The volume alone will exhaust them.
---
7. Conclusion
Minister, far from demonstrating inertia, the Civil Service’s approach to infrastructure delivery exemplifies the highest standards of administrative prudence. Any attempt to accelerate processes risks undermining the very foundations of responsible government.
As ever, I remain at your disposal should you require further clarification — or, indeed, further obfuscation.
Isn’t part of the reason for higher costs in the UK related to how risk is managed and priced into construction costs? The whole subcontractors and external agents vs in-house is downstream of decisions to minimise risk at the very significant outcome of higher costs. Another factor is quality which is being ratcheted upwards through increased demands for nicer things or more bureaucratic requirements. With the project management triangle if you want high quality and your timescales are rigid your costs are going rise to compensate.
How many people care if their Swindon to London journey is 50 instead of 60? Are they electing people to get it, shouting at their MP about faster trains? It means for the odd meeting with a client, you get 10 more minutes in bed.
Britain overwhelmingly has the valuable infrastructure that it needs. It would be nice to join Heathrow with the Great Western Main Line and I could get a train direct from Heathrow to Swindon in about an hour instead of 90 minutes by coach, but a few times a year, do I really care that much? Is it going to stop me seeing a company in Switzerland? Is it worth the near £1bn cost to do it?
So, much of our infrastructure development is political vanity. It doesn't get spent because of necessity but because there's money to burn and someone with an ego that wants to build monuments to their greatness like Millenium museums, bridges, HS2. The failures in this country are about boring things like not enough medical staff, police that don't deal with crime, railways that can't price correctly and the failure of government to get out of the way, put money back into people's pockets and let them do efficient things.
I haven't been responsible for a major government infrastructure project, but I have been involved in investment decisions in the private sector as a CFO - where some of the dynamics are likely the same.
On that basis I would add (1) that consistency of purpose is as important as consistency of funding. Often what derails a development programme or makes it more expensive is chopping and changing about what one is trying to achieve because there is not sufficient coherence at the level of the leadership team about what is wanted. Often it doesn't matter so much what you as decide as long as you decide something and stick to it. And that you decide this reasonably quickly. A hard decision doesn't need to be a slow decision.
And (2) as in one of the examples that Sam quotes, you quite often get a situation where the board does not like the cost of what is proposed but sees the the requirement for whatever is being costed. Which leads to a cycle of redoing the financial analysis to get to a lower (and undeliverable) cost, meaning (a) delay while this is done (b) an initial plan which is probably unrealistic (c) some sub-optimal decisions which later need to be reversed (d) lots of angst, further analysis (and probably delay) while the actual costs overshoot the new plan (e) a succession of new and ever increasing cost projections, which no-one believes (and which therefore damage the cost discipline in the project) and (f) an outcome which is at least expensive as the original proposal, but slower.
Capex cut in the early 1990s and not recommenced until the 2010s. Surely the railways weren't being fattened up for their mid-90s privatisation. Surely Railtrack and the first TOCs didn't cut capex to the bone? Surely not?